The euro-crisis as a catalyst of the Europeanization of public spheres? A crosstemporal study of the Netherlands and Germany by Meijers, Maurits
A New Concept of European Federalism 
 
 
 
LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper Series 
The Euro-crisis as a catalyst of the 
Europeanization of public spheres? A cross-
temporal study of the Netherlands and 
Germany 
Maurits Meijers 
 
 
 
LEQS Paper No. 62/2013 
June 2013 
    2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the 
views of the editors or the LSE. 
© Maurits Meijers 
Editorial Board 
Dr Mareike Kleine 
Dr Vassilis Monastiriotis 
Dr Jonathan White 
Dr Katjana Gattermann 
 
                                                                                                                                        
The Euro-crisis as a catalyst of the 
Europeanization of public spheres?  
A cross-temporal study of the Netherlands 
and Germany 
Maurits Meijers* 
 
Abstract 
In this paper it is analysed whether the euro-crisis has induced a change in the degree of 
Europeanization of national public spheres. It is argued that ‘mediatizing politics’ on TV is a 
prerequisite for the accountability structures of liberal democracies. Examining the degree of 
Europeanization of public broadcaster news in Germany and the Netherlands in 2008 and 
2011 this paper gauges the changes in terms of visibility of European issues and in terms of 
salience of items on European issues. Moreover it is analysed which news categories 
predominate, the tone of news items on European issues, and which explicit evaluations of 
European integration appear – and how these elements are affected by the euro-crisis. Finally, 
it is shown that although the Europeanization of public spheres increased as the euro-crisis 
developed, the EU was mostly portrayed negatively, focused predominantly on economic 
issues and political contestation was hardly visible. 
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The Euro-crisis as a catalyst of the 
Europeanization of public spheres?  
A cross-temporal study of the Netherlands 
and Germany 
 
Introduction 
The ambitious project of European integration is not faring well. While the 
members of the euro-zone initially believed they could get off scot-free, the 
rage of the financial markets in 2009 roared towards Europe, shaking the 
unstable fundaments of the monetary union, and the European Union (EU) in 
general. At the same time, Eurosceptic voices have become more pronounced 
questioning the EU’s democratic legitimacy as well as its capacity for 
accountable decision-making. In this context, it is relevant to examine what 
the effect of this ‘negative trend’ in European affairs has had on the 
Europeanization of national public spheres. As will be discussed below, the 
Europeanization of the national public sphere refers to the extent to which 
‘European affairs’ are (becoming) visible and salient in the national public 
spheres of European countries. Studying whether some form of European 
public sphere is emerging or not is especially significant as it is closely 
interwoven with the question of democratic credence of Europe’s governance 
structures. As Kaelble remarked, ‘the reinforcement of a European public 
sphere does not necessarily coincide with a more intensive European 
integration’ (2010, 27). On the contrary, as a crisis of European integration 
invokes debate throughout European societies, it might even prove conducive 
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to the formation of a European public sphere. It is this line of thought this 
essay intends to follow and test empirically.  
As three quarters of the Europeans watch television news daily (Norris 2000), 
TV news presents the most significant source of information on European 
affairs for most ‘ordinary citizens’. This essay will examine how ‘negative’ 
political developments affect the Europeanization of public spheres by 
comparing the level of Europeanization in public broadcasting television 
news before the escalation of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2008 with 
the degree of Europeanization during this crisis in 2011 in two European 
countries, namely, Germany and the Netherlands. By coding over 1200 news 
items from over 100 news bulletins, the data allows us to make preliminary 
conclusions about each news item’s dimension, its news type, its salience, and its 
overall tone. Moreover, it will be gauged to what extent explicit (opposing) 
evaluations of the EU were present.  
Before elucidating the research design, the normative utility of a Europe-wide 
public sphere and how this might be observed empirically will be briefly 
discussed. Subsequently, the results will be discussed followed by a 
discussion of their theoretical implications. 
 
The European Public Sphere and the Quality of Democracy 
In the light of the debates on the enduring ‘democratic deficit’ of EU decision-
making the significance of a common European public sphere for the quality 
of democracy in Europe is often emphasized. In normative terms it can be 
argued that open participation in public debate and the ability to challenge 
public authorities within the public sphere is a prerequisite for the creation of 
a legitimate political community that underpins liberal democracy (e.g. 
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Habermas 1962). Importantly, this focus on the need for free political 
communication is far from novel. As Jean Terrier and Peter Wagner have 
noted, already Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) observed that a free society is 
conditioned by the manifestation of a ‘communicative flux’ between a variety 
of individuals (2006, 16). Such a ‘communicative flux’ concerning political 
affairs is what is often referred to as ‘political communication’. According to 
Jarren and Donges, political communication is the ‘central mechanism for the 
formulation, aggregation, creation and implementation of collectively binding 
decisions’ (2002:22). Thus, if we understand political communication as the 
imparting of politics in today’s media-democracy (Schuppert 2008, 250), 
political communication denotes the process of making ‘politics’ public. This 
opens the possibility of politics being tried and questioned openly, as well as 
being either supported or rejected. Indeed, only by ‘publishing politics’ it can 
be monitored and reviewed critically (Korte & Fröhlich 2004). In this regard, 
contemporary politics can only be democratic insofar as it is mediatized. 
Ultimately, then, this comes down to the rule of thumb of legitimation through 
communication (Korte & Fröhlich 2004, 259; cf. Sarcinelli 1998, 11).  
This definition of legitimate governance has significant implications. If 
democratic legitimacy does not solely depend on a legitimate governing 
process but also on the medial transmission of these governing processes, the 
locus of responsibility also lies with the news media. This, then, highlights 
once more the significance of studying the condition of political 
communication of European affairs. Recognizing this central role of the media 
for legitimate governance is in line with the observation that the opportunities 
for politicization of EU politics do not solely depend on the rearrangement of 
the institutional framework (cf. Hix 2008). Instead, successful politicization is 
contingent on multiple factors and an open, communicative public sphere 
seems one of them. Precisely, as White remarks, it is essential to realize that ‘a 
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sense of a shared predicament with other Europeans can then be developed 
gradually in the unfolding political process rather than proclaimed (and 
perhaps rejected) at a decisive constitutional moment’ (2010, 118).  
Such a gradual formation of a common European communicative space has 
been deemed impossible due to the insurmountable obstacles of linguistic and 
cultural diversity among Europe’s citizens (e.g. Smith 1992; Grimm 1997). 
From this perspective, democracy on EU level is inevitably deficient as there 
is no potential for a common public ‘space’ where the central practices of 
citizenship can take shape. In keeping with the presently predominant social 
constructivist approach, however, Adam Ferguson already emphasized that 
the ‘spirit’ (or ‘national spirit’) which potentially stems from the ‘concern for 
common affairs’ does not require a pre-political bond and, thus, does not 
need to exist before the interaction takes place (Terrier and Wagner 2006, 16). 
This is reminiscent of the much cited transactionalist account by Karl W. 
Deutsch (1957) on the potential for cross-border rapprochement of identities 
and the creation of a sense of a shared fate through social communication. In 
such Deutschian terms, a ‘common’ can be created though interaction, and 
interaction only. It is important to recognize that these reflections on how a 
political bond may be conceived is predominantly an ideological matter 
rather than primarily empirical as it is ‘bound up in broader questions of the 
health of contemporary democracy’, as White noted (2010, 119). Indeed, the 
‘essentialist’ rejections of a European public sphere such as those from Grimm 
or Smith are strongly related to certain normative conceptions of democracy 
and of the nature of deliberation and debate (e.g. Habermas 1997; Trenz and 
Eder 2004).  
Among those that regard the emergence of a European public sphere as 
plausible, we can discern three different empirical approaches. First, we can 
identify those scholars who envisage a European public sphere essentially as 
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a replication of the national public sphere on a transnational, European level. 
These approaches conceive of the development of a European public sphere 
as the emergence of pan-European mass media such as the TV channel 
Euronews or the weekly European Voice. Scholars relying on this 
conceptualization come, understandably, with negative conclusions about its 
emergence (e.g. Schlesinger 1995). Unitary European transnational mass 
media is likely to remain a marginal and elitist phenomenon.  
The two remaining empirical approaches argue that is more fruitful to study 
the process of the Europeanization of national public spheres, rather than 
assessing whether a single, unitary European public sphere will or can 
emerge. These approaches recognize the continuing centrality of national 
society for ordinary citizens, while at the same time acknowledging the 
pervasiveness of transnationalization in Europe as a result of European 
integration. The second kind of empirical approaches comprises those 
scholars that conceptualize the Europeanization of public spheres as the 
emergence of a single ‘European perspective’ as expressed in national media 
as well as the increasing relevance of common European symbols (e.g. Kaelble 
2002; Diez Medrano 2009).  
Thirdly, we can discern empirical approaches that operationalize the 
Europeanization of the public sphere as the visibility and presence of 
‘European issues’ in the national media. These ‘European issues’ can be 
conceptualized as issues having an explicit EU focus. (e.g. Gerhards 2000; 
Peter et al. 2003) Or, alternatively, a less restrictive view of the 
Europeanization of public spheres focuses both on the presence of EU issues 
and issues on ‘other European countries/actors’ in national public discourse 
(e.g. Eder & Kantner 2000; Trenz 2010; Risse 2010; Koopmans & Statham 
2010a; Wessler et al. 2008). The distinction between EU issues and issues on 
‘other European countries/actors is what Koopmans and colleagues have 
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labelled as ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal Europeanization’ respectively 
(Koopmans and Erbe 2004, 101; Koopmans and Statham 2010b, 28). From the 
abovementioned approaches we can distil four main indicators for the 
Europeanization of national public spheres (cf. Machill et al. 2006, 63-4; Risse 
2010, 116-119, Koopmans and Statham 2010b): 
 Visibility of (and degree of interaction with) EU actors or policies in the 
national news (vertical and supranational Europeanization) 
 Visibility of (and degree of interaction with) European actors or countries 
in the national news (horizontal Europeanization) 
 Transnationally shared issue cycles (or synchronization): Transnational 
thematic convergence of news issues 
 Same criteria of relevance: The same issues are equally salient 
transnationally. 
A looming issue for the study of the Europeanization of public sphere is 
question of thresholds or benchmarks.1 Indeed, one can ask what is the degree 
of Europeanization needed to be able call a public sphere Europeanized (cf. 
Risse and van der Steeg 2003, 20)? Machill et al. note “[t]o date no scale has 
been developed in international communication and media science by means 
of which the degree of Europeanization of national public spheres can be 
measured.” (Machill et al. 2006, 79). I would argue that increase over time in 
the four abovementioned indicators is the determining factor for identifying 
Europeanization of national public spheres (see also Koopmans and Sthatam 
2010b, 43). After all, ‘Europeanization’ refers to a (gradual) process in which 
‘Europe’ becomes more visible and national news is to a greater extent 
synchronized thematically with other European countries’ news. 
As Chantal Mouffe stressed, democracy is unthinkable without a ‘vibrant 
“agonistic” public sphere of contestation where different hegemonic political 
                                                        
1 I owe this point to Katjana Gattermann. 
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projects can be confronted’ (2005, 3). Mouffe’s agonistic perspective of politics 
recognizes that in human sociability reciprocity and hostility are inherently 
intertwined concepts. Importantly, opponents should not be seen as enemies 
but as adversaries. The concept of ‘agonism’ in democratic theory emphasizes 
that although adversaries do engage in a confrontation trying to defeat one 
another, this defeat should never definite. For the sake of the principle of 
parity, conflict and confrontation must be continuous. In this regard, 
polarization and contestation should be seen as crucial preconditions for an 
emerging European public sphere (Risse 2010, 112). Therefore, the 
Europeanization of national public spheres might augment considerably 
when Europe’s societies are confronted with a common crisis demanding 
contentious decisions. Indeed, in precarious times when weighty decisions on 
both substantive and institutional issues are taken a proliferation of 
contestation might be expected. For these reasons, it is of additional relevance 
to examine the extent to which television coverage on European affairs shows 
elements of adversarialism and agonistic politics. 
In their meta-analysis of European public sphere studies, Machill et al. show 
that the generally shared conclusion for all states, also for Germany and the 
Netherlands, is that EU reporting only accounts for a small part of the total 
reporting (Machill et al. 2006). Nevertheless, Koopmans et al. show that as 
European integration deepened over the course of the 1990s, vertical 
Europeanization has increased (Koopmans, Erbe and Meyer 2010, 68-9). In a 
similar study, Koopmans and Erbe conclude that the extent of EU coverage by 
the German print media differs per issue area (2004). The authors argue that 
the German media ‘adequately reflect the Europeanization of policy-making’ 
by reporting more EU issues on those policy areas where the EU has acquired 
competences in (ibid.). Taking monetary policy as an example, Koopmans and 
Erbe argue that ‘the most important determinant of patterns of mass media 
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coverage is simply where the decision-making power in a policy field is 
concentrated.’ (ibid., 155). This responsiveness of (vertical) Europeanization to 
the EU’s political development leads to the expectation to see an increase EU 
level news on economic-financial matters on as the euro-crisis unfolded. 
Moreover, Machill et al show that all European public sphere studies under 
discussion emphasize that EU reporting tends to augment at particular points 
in time, around particular events (Machill et al. 2006, 76). Indeed, ‘[t]he 
analysis shows that the intensity of EU reporting always increases rapidly 
when a topic that is of interest EU-wide or at least in several EU states is 
connected with a particular event.’ (ibid.). Although the ‘euro-crisis’ is not 
exactly an ‘event’, it nevertheless qualifies as atypical circumstance compared 
to the progression of European integration before that is likely to increase the 
degree of Europeanization of national public spheres. 
 
Research Design 
Method and case selection 
The focus of the empirical research in this essay lies on the Europeanization of 
televised news. A recent Eurobarometer survey revealed that for 79% of the 
respondents television was their main source of information on European 
political affairs. This stands in stark contrast with the 47% of respondents who 
designated the print media as their primary source of information on 
European political affairs (European Commission 2011, 17). The survey 
moreover revealed that the respondents regarded televised news more 
trustworthy than news in the print media. Thus, although the scope for 
deliberation and debate is much smaller in television news than in, say, 
broadsheet ‘quality’ newspapers, it is imperative to examine the actual level 
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of Europeanization the majority of the ‘ordinary citizens’ in Germany and the 
Netherlands are exposed to, and whether these have altered during the 
progression of the euro-crisis. To be sure, the limited sample size does not 
allow for making reliable conclusions about the (non-)existence of a 
European(ized) public sphere in general. However, this paper’s explicit focus 
is to find whether there are indicators that signal a cross-temporal change in the 
extent of Europeanization of public broadcasting media before and during the 
European debt crises in Germany and the Netherlands. 
The empirical approach in this paper is based on the quantitative content 
analysis method presented by Peter, Semetko and de Vreese (2003), albeit in 
an adapted form on a few important points. The study by Peter et al. (2003) is 
a cross-national investigation of ‘television news coverage of EU affairs’ of 
five countries over an eleven month period in the year 2000. The study gauges 
the amount of EU coverage, its placement and duration in the bulletins, its 
thematic structure, its degree of domesticity and its tone/evaluation. 
Importantly, Peter et al.’s cross-national study solely focused on ‘EU-ization’ 
of political news in the national media, thereby disregarding levels of 
‘horizontal Europeanization’. The present study therefore will take horizontal 
Europeanization into account. Moreover, as the aim of the present study is to 
assess whether the extent and substance of ‘European coverage’ has changed 
during the euro-crisis, a cross-temporal element has been included. Another 
important difference with the measures of Peter et al. (2003) and the present 
study is that Peter et al. did not differentiate between the tone of a news item 
and the presence of explicit evaluations. In the present study, the tone of a 
news item refers to whether public broadcasters depicted the news item 
positively, negatively or neutrally. ‘Evaluations’, on the other hand, point to 
the presence of explicit assessments of European integration voiced by political 
actors in the news item.  
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Table 1. Research questions 
RQ1 To what extent has the visibility of European Union 
increased in the evening television news over the course of 
the ‘euro-crisis’?  
RQ2 To what extent has the visibility of (actors of) other 
European countries (horizontal Europeanization) increased 
in the evening television news over the course of the 
‘euro-crisis’?  
RQ3 Which types of news were predominant on the EU and on 
other European countries before and during the ‘euro-
crisis’? 
RQ4 How has the salience of European news changed over the 
course of the ‘euro-crisis’? 
RQ5 How has the tone of EU news coverage changed over the 
course of the ‘euro-crisis’? 
RQ5 To what extent has contestation on EU issues been visible?  
The research questions are presented in Table 1. For both countries, two 
natural fourteen-day samples of public broadcasters’ evening news (April and 
September) have been selected for coding.2 In these samples, all news items 
have been coded for both 2008 and 2011.3 As the temporal range for both 
years has been limited to a two-week sample in April and September, it was 
essential that no major European or domestic events had taken place during 
or around those weeks as this would reduce the reliability of the empirics 
and, consequently, obscure the validity of the conclusions. Germany and the 
Netherlands have been selected based on the fact that the style of political 
communication and the format of the public broadcasting news are relatively 
similar (Heinderyckx 1993; Peter et al. 2003, 311). Moreover, as Machill et al. 
(2006, 73) have demonstrated, both Germany and the Netherlands have a high 
‘overall tendency of the degree of Europeanization in comparison with other 
EU states’. Similarly Koopmans et al. have shown Germany and the 
Netherlands both have intermediary levels of Europeanization. More 
precisely, in Koopmans and Statham’s (2010a) study, Germany and the 
                                                        
2 Although sampling on the basis of natural weeks is not uncommon, it is far from an optimal 
sampling method. Yet, due to a lack of resources a ‘constructed week’ sampling has not been 
possible (cf. Wessler et al. 2010) 
3 For all bulletins the weather forecast has not been taken into account. 
Maurits Meijers 
11   
 
Netherlands demonstrate a degree of vertical Europeanization over 10 of the 
total newspaper coverage over the whole coding period (1990-2002) 
(Koopmans et al. 2010, 73). Thus, in terms of Europeanization of national 
public spheres Germany and the Netherlands are about equally 
Europeanized. Another compelling reason to select these countries is that the 
Netherlands and Germany are usually included in media analysis of EU 
coverage (see Machill et al. 2006, 73) thus increasing the comparability of my 
results. 
 
Measures 
Below, I will briefly clarify the different variables chosen. Where the purpose 
or nature of a category is in need of additional explanation this will given. A 
complete overview of the coding scheme can be found in the appendix. 
Each news item’s dimension will be coded as being either ‘domestic’, 
‘European Union’, ‘other European country’4, or ‘international’. The 
‘international’ dimension is a rather broad category comprising both 
supranational institutions as other non-European countries. To be sure, often 
these four dimensions overlap. In such a case the predominant dimension has 
been coded. Every news item is labelled according to the type of issue it 
addresses. Each item was assigned one following eight categories: ‘socio-
political’, ‘economic’, ‘socio-cultural’, ‘(common) foreign policy’, ‘armed 
conflicts’, ‘miscellaneous’, ‘sports’ or ‘trivial’. These categories are relatively 
broad in order to ensure concise results. Whenever the categories overlapped 
the predominant one was selected. ‘Miscellaneous’ refers to other 
newsworthy events like natural disasters and accidents. ‘Trivial’ stands for 
                                                        
4 All EU members, EU member-candidates and members of Schengen are regarded as ‘European’. 
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news stories meant for entertainment. The salience of each news item has been 
calculated on the basis of its relative duration. This relative duration was 
calculated based on the mean duration of a news item for each year for each 
country. An item has been attributed a ‘low’ salience when its duration was 
shorter or equal to 30% of the mean duration, high salience if it was equal to 
or higher than 70% of the mean duration, and intermediate salience for the 
30% in between.  
For items with a EU focus (that is, a ‘European Union’ dimension) its tone has 
been coded as positive, neutral or negative. Lastly, it has been recorded for 
EU items whether the political actors voiced in the coverage provided 
evaluations of the EU, and if so how. There were five possible categories: 
‘Eurosceptic’, ‘critical Europeanist’, ‘Europhile’, ‘opposing evaluations’ and 
‘no evaluation’. An evaluation is ‘Eurosceptic’ when the functionality or the 
legitimacy of the EU or its policies is questioned. ‘Critical Europeanist’ stands 
for those voices that do not question or are supportive of the institutional 
status quo but engage in discussion over particular policies. ‘Europhile’ 
stands for those voices that defend the EU both in terms of policies and of 
institutional design. When multiple different evaluations were voiced, that is, 
when opposing opinions were included in the coverage the item received the 
label ‘opposing evaluations’.  
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Results 
Visibility 
In Figure 1 the visibility of each news dimension for April and September 
2008 for both countries are shown. As can be seen for both countries, domestic 
news in the evening news bulletin is predominant constituting more than half 
of all news stories. Peter et al. (2003, 314) demonstrated that in the year 2000 
in Germany and the Netherlands the amount of coverage on the European 
Union was no more than 4% of the total coverage. In comparison, in 2008 in 
Germany EU coverage has risen by approximately 2%, while in the 
Netherlands a remarkable decline of EU coverage took place, within this 
sample at least. The decline is remarkable considering the surging 
Euroscepticism among political parties in the Netherlands since the 
ascendance of Eurosceptic politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002. 
 
Figure 1. Visibility all news items April and September 2008 
It is also surprising that the Germany’s degree of vertical Europeanization is 
much higher than in the Netherlands. Yet, it should be noted that the overall 
tone and style of the ARD Tagesschau is more formal than the NOS Journaal 
and that the level of sophistication of political affairs tends to be higher in the 
German news than in the Dutch news. As the complexity of EU affairs is 
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generally high, this might serves as an explanation for the diverging degrees 
of vertical Europeanization. On the other hand, however, the Dutch public 
broadcaster, NOS, does allocate almost three per cent more broadcasting 
space to news stories on ‘other European countries’ than the ARD does. Thus, 
the image is more nuanced if we calculate the overall degree of Europeanization, 
that is, both ‘vertical Europeanization’ (items on the EU) and ‘horizontal 
Europeanization’ (items on other European countries). In this case, the overall 
percentage of Europeanized news coverage in 2008 for the Netherlands is 
13.7% and for Germany 14.7%.  
If we take a look at Figure 2, we see that the progression of the euro-crisis and 
an increase of Europeanized news coverage are strongly correlated. As 
Kaelble correctly remarked, Europeanization of the national public sphere is 
not necessarily linked to successful European integration (2010, 27). On the 
contrary, we see that a crisis of European scope tends to Europeanize the 
news of the public broadcasters both in Germany and the Netherlands. The 
degree of EU coverage has been doubled in Germany, while in the 
Netherlands the values have tripled. The overall level of Europeanization of 
news items (stories both on the EU and ‘other European countries’) in 2011 
was 21.4% in Germany and 17.8% of the items in the Netherlands.5 It is 
surprising that while the degree of domestic news in Germany dropped in 
2011 as European news increased it remained stable in the Netherlands. Thus, 
whereas in Germany it seems that predominantly domestic items have ‘given 
                                                        
5 The fact that ‘horizontal Europeanization’ seems not have increased in the course of the euro-
crisis might be explained by the method of coding news dimensions in a mutually exclusive way. 
A news item could be labelled with only one of the four news dimensions – ‘domestic’, ‘EU, ‘other 
European country’, ‘international’. As was to be expected, in almost all news items concerning the 
euro-crisis, other European countries had a prominent place in the item. Yet, since the news 
stories on the economic crisis mostly addressed the issues as ‘European’ issues – mentioning not 
only actors from the specific European country (in this case often Greece) but also from other 
European countries and EU officials – the news items were labelled as being ‘European’ 
The political claims approach Koopmans and Statham (2010b) employ, is better capable of 
capturing these nuances. Yet, this approach requires a lot more resources. For our present 
purpose, this manner of coding seems sufficient. 
Maurits Meijers 
15   
 
way’ to EU-related items, in the Netherlands domestic coverage declined only 
by 1%.6  
 
Figure 2. Visibility all news items April and September 2011 
 
News categories  
Having confirmed that vertical Europeanization has increased during the 
course of the euro-crisis, it is illuminating to see whether we can witness a 
change in the news categories of the Europeanized news stories. As the 
degree of vertical Europeanization was rather low in 2008 for both Germany 
and the Netherlands, the amount of observations was low. This is most clearly 
the case with the Netherlands. Notwithstanding, the present data indicates a 
relevant trend that should be tested further empirically in future research.  
                                                        
6 Notably, in March 2011 both the German and the Dutch public broadcasters allocated a high 
degree of broadcasting time to the nuclear disaster around the Fukushima plant in Japan. This 
partly accounts for the high level of ‘international’ news items. Another reason for the high 
amount of ‘international’ news items is the fact that all NATO summits had to be coded as ‘non-
European international’ as NATO includes prominent non-European members. 
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Figure 3. Germany and the Netherlands: News categories for EU news 
stories (sports and trivial news not taken into account) 
As Figure 3 indicates, the escalation of the euro-crisis is expressed by the 
dramatically increasing degree of ‘economic’ news for EU-related items. In 
2011, a great majority of EU-related news items in both countries dealt with 
issues regarding the economy. Consequently, the Europe, or the EU, an 
‘average citizen’ in Germany or the Netherlands encountered on television in 
2011, is an ‘economic’ Europe. This, then, means that other relevant policy 
areas of the EU are hardly televised. Of course, it seems problematic when the 
European Union is practically equated with the European Monetary Union 
(EMU). This reduces the potential scope of politicization of other substantive 
EU issues. 
As can be seen in Figure 3, the percentage of news items on European 
common foreign policy is surprisingly high. The relatively high degree of 
items on ‘foreign policy’ in 2008 in Germany and the Netherlands can 
primarily be explained by the extensive coverage on the Russia-Georgia crisis 
2008 – when France under Nicolas Sarkozy held the rotating presidency of the 
European Council. The leaders of the EU member-states were able to agree on 
a common position towards the crisis and this enabled Sarkozy to act on 
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behalf of all member-states. This allowed the items to be codified as ‘EU’ 
news. In comparison to these fluctuations in the predominant news categories 
for EU-related news, the news categories for domestic news remained 
relatively stable between 2008 and 2011.  
For EU-related news, however, specific events or occurrences tend to 
determine what news categories were the most prevalent (cf. Machill et al. 
2006, 76). The peaks in the specific news categories in 2008 and 2011 might 
indicate that televised news on the EU is predominated by ‘exceptional 
issues’, such as crises and conflicts (see also Peter et al. 2003; de Vreese and 
Schmitt 2007). This stands in contrast to the coverage of domestic political 
affairs where less exceptional, more routinized political processes are 
addressed. 
 
Salience 
Figure 4 shows the salience of EU and ‘other European country’ news stories 
in 2008 and 2011 for both countries. For both countries we can identify a 
significant increase of highly salient Europeanized news items between 2008 
and 2011. This shows that as European sovereign debt crisis unfolded, 
‘Europeanized news’ was not only more present (in terms of the number of 
items) it was also more prominent in the bulletins (in terms of length per 
item). Thus, not only were European matter discussed to a much greater 
degree their relative importance had increased considerably as well. 
In the case of the Netherlands, the amount of news items with a ‘high 
salience’ has risen by 22%. Interestingly, however, also the level of news items 
with ‘low salience’ has risen, while the amount of intermediately salient news 
items has sharply declined. This indicates that the NOS Journaal offered both 
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longer and arguably more detailed news items as well as a higher amount of 
shorter news flashes on European affairs in 2011. In Germany, in comparison 
with the Netherlands, we see that the overall salience of Europeanized news 
items is higher. The amount of shorter items with low salience, however, did 
not increase as it did in the Netherlands. Overall, both in 2008 and 2011, the 
salience of ‘European news items’ is significantly higher in Germany than in 
the Netherlands. This is in accordance with the results concerning the 
visibility of the EU in German and Dutch news, suggesting that EU news, in 
general, is regarded as more significant in Germany than in the Netherlands. 
Figure 5 shows the salience of economic news stories in 2011 for both 
countries. Clearly, as approximately 90% and 70% of the economic news in 
Germany and the Netherlands respectively was ‘highly salient’, EU economic 
news in 2011 was very prominently placed in the news bulletins. 
 
 
  The Netherlands Germany 
Figure 4.  Salience for EU and ‘other European country’ news stories 
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Figure 5. Salience of economic EU stories in 2011. 
 
Tone 
Peter et al. (2003) demonstrated that in 2000 approximately 65% of the news 
stories in Germany and the Netherlands the EU were depicted neutrally. As 
mentioned above, Peter et al. did not distinguish between tone (by the 
broadcaster) and explicit evaluations (by the actors voiced), so one has to take 
the comparison with a grain of salt. Figure 6 depicts the changes in news tone 
between 2008 and 2011 in EU news items for Germany and the Netherlands. 
A striking difference between the two countries is the overwhelmingly degree 
of positive coverage in the Netherlands and the lack of negative reporting in 
2008. This is primarily due to the coverage of Sarkozy’s mediation attempt on 
behalf of the EU in the Russia-Georgia crisis that was generally received 
positively.  
When comparing the values of 2008 with those of 2011 it is evident that in 
both countries negative reporting has increased enormously. Interestingly, the 
level of negativity in 2011 is very similar for the Netherlands and Germany. 
This suggests that we can witness a trend wherein the euro-crisis contributes 
to negative coverage of the EU and its policies. In line with this trend, a 
considerable change occurred in the issue negativity for EU items on 
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economic issues. For example, whereas in 2008 only approximately 30% of the 
‘economic’ stories were accompanied by a negative tone, in 2011 over 80% 
were negatively portrayed in both countries (not shown).  
  
  The Netherlands Germany 
Figure 6.  Tone of EU news stories 
 
Evaluation 
Surprisingly, in 2008 there were for both countries no instances of evaluations 
of the EU or of open contestation (i.e. ‘opposing evaluations’) in this sample. 
Although partly explained by the relatively small number of observations, 
another explanation might be the enduring ‘permissive consensus’ on specific 
EU policy issues despite the rise of Eurosceptic parties (in the Netherlands). 
This, we can speculate, has led the public broadcasters to think that political 
contestation of EU matters were not newsworthy enough to make the evening 
television news.  
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Figure 7. Percentage of news stories containing evaluations in 2011 
Figure 7 shows the percentage of news items covering explicit evaluations of 
the EU and its policies in 2011. Thus, although the number of news stories 
containing explicit evaluations of the European Union has increased 
considerably in 2011 compared to 2008, the overall values are still extremely 
low. Of what kind of evaluations, then, are these respective 27.8 % and 26.1% 
for Germany and the Netherlands in 2011 comprised? In Germany, 10% of the 
news items with ‘evaluations’ were predominantly Eurosceptic. In the 
Netherlands, Euroscepticism in the evening news was more pronounced as 
more than 30% of the EU news stories containing ‘evaluations’ voiced 
Eurosceptic voices. In accordance with these results, 30% of the evaluative 
news items in Germany, compared to 16.7% of the stories with ‘evaluations’ 
in the Netherlands, contained ‘critical Europeanist’ positions on the EU. As 
briefly explained above, the ‘critical Europeanist’ evaluation stands for voices 
that in principle approve of and support European integration, yet criticise 
the status quo – either with regards to issues on institutionalisation or to 
substantive policy issues. In both countries the majority of the ‘evaluations’ 
fall under the category of ‘opposing evaluations’. 60% of the news stories 
containing ‘evaluations’ in Germany and 50% of the items containing 
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‘evaluations’ in the Netherlands voiced multiple actors holding diverging 
positions on the European Union. This points to some presence of political 
contestation in the public broadcasting news media.7 It seems to be a postive 
thing that when the public broadcasters voice opinionated actors they mostly 
present a balanced picture giving voice to opposing positions. The overall 
picture, however, is particularly bleak. Merely about 15% of the news items 
on the EU in 2011 show some degree of debate amongst political actors. 
Remarkably, in none of the instances where ‘evaluations’ were present 
‘Europhile’ voices were predominant. This means that for both years in both 
Germany and the Netherlands, no actors were voiced that were outspokenly 
positive on the EU (in this sample).  
 
Discussion 
To recapitulate, this paper examined the changes in the degrees of 
Europeanization in the television broadcasting news in Germany and the 
Netherlands over the course of the euro-crisis. The results shown above imply 
that the escalation of the euro-crisis has positively affected the visibility of 
European affairs. However, news coverage on ‘other European countries’ had 
slightly decreased. Furthermore, the data indicates that in this period of crisis 
the salience of European news items has increased. In particular, the results 
imply that the controversy over the national sovereign debt crises has led to a 
predominance of economic and financial news with regards to the EU. Yet, 
the data suggests that this increase ‘vertical Europeanization’ comes at a cost 
as it is accompanied by a considerable increase in issue negativity of EU 
affairs. Finally, the empirical findings suggest that the presence of some  
                                                        
7 For future empirical research it would be illuminating to examine by detailed content analysis 
of television news which actors from which political backgrounds make the different evaluations. 
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Table 2. Concise overall results (results of both countries combined, mean results) 
RQ1 To what extent has the visibility of European 
Union increased in the evening television news 
over the course of the ‘euro-crisis’?  
Increased by 5.7 %. 
RQ2 To what extent has the visibility of (actors of) 
other European countries (horizontal 
Europeanization) increased in the evening 
television news over the course of the ‘euro-
crisis’?  
Decreased by 0.6 %. 
 
 
RQ3 Which type of EU news was most predominant 
before and during the ‘euro-crisis’? 
2008: Foreign policy*  
2011: Economic news. 
RQ4 How has the salience of European news changed 
over the course of the ‘euro-crisis’? 
EU news became three 
times more ‘highly salient’  
RQ5 How has the tone of EU news coverage changed 
over the course of the ‘euro-crisis’? 
EU news became more 
negative. More than 50 % of 
the messages were 
negative. 
RQ5 To what extent has contestation on EU issues 
been visible?  
Lack of deliberation. 
*  Due to Sarkozy’s involvement in the Russia-Georgia crisis. 
degree of ‘socializing conflict’ and adversarialism was extremely low. Table 2 
briefly summarizes the results by providing succinct answers to the research 
questions. 
As Machill et al (2006) remark, scholars studying the Europeanization of 
public spheres account for national differences in their data by referring to the 
particular predominance of a domestic event or of particular national actors. 
Arguably, the emergence of pressing issues on a European level would 
remove or reduce such cases of national specificity. This is indeed what the 
data has shown. Nevertheless in line with previous studies (Peter et al. 2003, 
Machil et al. 2006, Koopmans and Statham 2010a) coverage of ‘European 
affairs’ still accounts only for small part of the total reporting. Yet, as the 
study by Koopmans and Statham has shown, the  ‘European level is visible in 
fields in which it is influential.’ (Statham 2010a, 285). The findings presented 
in this paper also underline this thesis. Once decisions taken on EU level 
(albeit predominantly through intergovernmental negotiation) have 
significant repercussions for its members, the EU’s visibility augmented. 
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Thus, Kaelble’s suggestion that the formation of some form of a European 
public sphere does not have to coincide with successful European integration 
seems to be confirmed. The results suggest that an increase in ‘EU’ news and 
the emergence of the euro-crisis are strongly correlated. Thus, the visibility of 
the European Union has augmented considerably to the escalation of the 
financial crisis in Europe. Peter et al. (2003) were scepticism about the 
emergence of a European public sphere in the beginning of this century as 
according to their results merely four per cent of the television news coverage 
dealt with the EU. By taking into account ‘horizontal Europeanization’, that is, 
news stories on other European countries, this empirical research has 
nuanced this image. Furthermore, the economic crisis in Europe has 
effectuated a ‘parallelization of issue cycles’ in the media across national 
borders. The extensive coverage of news on the economy, both in Germany 
and in the Netherlands, suggests a thematic synchronization of both 
countries’ public broadcasting news. Moreover, as ‘Europeanized economic 
news’ became more salient in both countries this also indicates that both 
countries increasingly share the same ‘criteria of relevance’.  
The Eurobarometer survey “Les habitudes médiatiques dans l’UE” revealed 
that there was a substantial change in the sentiments among EU citizens on 
whether the national media address the political affairs of the EU sufficiently 
or not. The survey demonstrated that the sentiment that the television media 
concentrate sufficiently on EU issues rose impressively by 15% between 2007 
and 2011 (Eurobarometer 2011, 34). Interestingly, this corresponds with the 
increase of vertical Europeanization in the German and Dutch national 
television news this essay has demonstrated. Also in the perception of 
Europe’s citizens, then, has Europe become increasingly present in the 
national public sphere.  
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This increase in ‘vertical Europeanization’, however, does come at a price. The 
great emphasis on economic issues has significantly limited the potential for 
coverage on other substantive EU issues. Dominated by negative news on 
economic issues, coverage on the EU tends to underexpose issues on non- or 
less contentious EU decision-making. Indeed, exceptional events or themes 
tend to dominate ‘EU’ news. This inevitably means that, at least in public 
broadcasting television news, other areas of EU policy-making are scarcely 
addressed. Consequently, if we recognize the central role the media plays in 
legitimate governance by addressing the relevant political issues and 
transmitting them to the citizens, it could be said that the public broadcasters 
in Germany and the Netherlands fail to fulfil their democratic duty. As noted 
above, the question whether a European public sphere is emerging is 
intrinsically linked with the issue of democratic legitimacy of the European 
Union and its policies. Indeed, ‘[t]he news media are thought to play a 
particularly important role in system support by priming citizens about the 
criteria that are most appropriate for evaluating the quality of democratic 
governance, as well as by framing whether the performance of the 
government is perceived positively or negatively against these standards’, 
Pippa Norris has stated (2011: 170).  
Norris suggests that the ‘democratic deficit’ in Europe results from a 
combination of three elements: ‘growing public expectations’ (‘demand-side 
theories’), negative news (‘intermediary accounts’), and/or failing government 
performance’ (‘supply-side theories’) (2011, 5-7). Intermediary accounts focus 
on the role of political communication in how citizens perceive governance 
performance. Indeed, according to de Vreese, ‘Euroscepticism is, at least 
partially, a function of the diet of information that citizens consume about 
European affairs’ (2007, 280). What, then, are the implications of the results 
above, showing increasing levels ‘issue negativity’ on EU stories?  
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Intermediary accounts on the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ suggest that the 
media stimulate public disaffection with politics by their emphasis on 
negative news (e.g. Capella and Jamieson 1997; Patterson 2002; Putnam 2000; 
Robinson 1975). From this perspective, the emergence of Europeanized public 
spheres can be detrimental to support for the EU, as rising levels of issue 
negativity accompanied the increase in Europeanization in 2011 of TV news. 
Others, however, have countered the idea that issue negativity inevitably 
reduces political support and stress the potentially positive functions of 
negative news. Martin, for example, argues that ‘when the media tell citizens 
that all is relatively well, the incentive to act in politics is weaker; if the media 
tell citizens that the country is in turmoil, then the incentive to act becomes 
stronger. In short, bad news about issues is good news for participation.’ 
(Martin 2008, 181). Indeed, reporting on problems and conflicts is capable of 
keeping the audience interested in the political affairs (see also Newton 1999; 
Norris 2000; Kleinnijenhuis et. al. 2006). Furthermore, De Vreese and Semetko 
have confirmed that although negatively framed news is capable of causing 
some degree of public cynicism and embitterment, it does not necessarily 
affect the level political participation (2002). This would mean that ‘negative 
news’ on the EU could be instrumental in forming responsive, critical 
European citizens.  
Paul Statham challenges the idea of rising public dissatisfaction with the EU 
due to a ‘communication deficit’ (2010b). According to Statham, the media 
‘tends to follow the political system in Europe’ and represents the political 
debate more than leading it (ibid., 139). On the one hand this seems plausible. 
The news media of course cannot be held responsible for this ‘wave of 
negativity’ as they are merely reporting such negative developments like the 
sovereign debt crises. On the other hand, however, such a perspective fails to 
recognize the role the media play as intermediary agents in the political 
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communication. Even only by selecting on which issues they will report or 
not, the news media inevitably influence the citizens’ perception of the 
political processes. The disproportionally high degree of domestic news items 
in the Dutch and German news bulletins in both years despite the increasing 
relevance of EU-level decision-making is an example of the conscious choices 
public broadcasters make with the selection of news issues.  
Furthermore, the remarkably low degree of evaluations of the EU and lack of 
coverage of conflict and adversarialism with regards to European affairs in 
the public broadcasting news has serious implications. As the results have 
shown, merely a quarter of the news items in 2011 on the EU contained some 
degree of ‘evaluation’ of the EU. And, only a small number of EU news items 
contained some instance of political debate where multiple actors with 
varying positions were voiced.  
This is problematic as openly publicised conflict over substantive issues is 
highly significant for the health of a (European) democracy as well as for the 
processual formation of a conception of a political bond. Indeed, we should 
understand conflict not necessarily as a negative phenomenon, but far more 
as a ‘ubiquitous social phenomenon of modern societies’ (Schuppert 2008, 
465). Georg Simmel has demonstrated how conflict is a central component of 
the process of socialization of a society or a ‘common’. ‘Conflict itself’, Simmel 
wrote, ‘is the resolution of the tension between the contraries’ (1904, 490). 
Conflict is a social tool to cope with (societal) discord and is instrumental in 
restoring or creating unity. In this sense, ‘conflict’ is a central element of social 
interaction that has an integrative and even stabilizing function (cf. Schuppert 
2008, 465). Moreover, as Nollmann notes, conflicts are ‘productive’ in the 
sense that they have the ability to redefine norms and rules and should for 
this reason be seen as a ‘source of social change’ (Nollmann 1997, 20; cf. 
Schuppert 2008, 468).  
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The results above, however, suggest that these conflicts with regards to the 
European Union are not recognized sufficiently by the Dutch and German 
public broadcasters. At least, adversarialism on European affairs is not given 
a platform on the most important stage of national politics, namely the 
evening television news. The fact that adversarialism is not covered in 
television news, however, does not mean it does not exist. Yet, it seems that 
the platform for contestation is elsewhere. The print media, by virtue of its 
format, is more suitable to reflect and give platform to diverging political 
positions. The public broadcasters, however, fail to cover and represent 
political debate and contestation in their most prominent news bulletins. This 
is problematic since the mass media have by virtue of their democratic 
responsibility a ‘postulate of reflectance’ (‘Widerspiegelungspostulat’) (Detjen 
1998, 276; cf. Schuppert 2008, 264). It is therefore not only their task to address 
all relevant issues but also to reflect the existing political pluralism. As the 
public broadcasters fail to fulfil this postulate, the task of ‘pluralistic 
reflectance’ is left to the written media only. Thereby, a majority of the 
citizens – who designate TV as their main source of information on political 
affairs – will be bypassed.  
Being hardly confronted by substantive political debate on EU affairs, and yet 
overwhelmed by negative coverage on the EU, it seems unlikely that citizen’s 
engagement in European affairs will be fostered. Nevertheless, the results 
above suggest how quickly national public spheres can ‘Europeanize’. 
Whether this shift in the level of Europeanization of national public spheres is 
a temporary phenomenon or a persisting alteration however remains 
uncertain. On the one hand, the extensive focus on EU news stories of 
extraordinary high news value might suggest that as the euro-crisis wanes, 
the levels of Europeanization will drop to ‘normal’. On the other hand, if the 
assumption is correct that the current sovereign debt crises can only be solved 
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by a closer union, sharing sovereignty on fiscal matters, this European 
economic crisis may have effectuated a change in the levels of 
Europeanization that is here to stay. If this is the case, this development is 
likely to have significant implications for legitimate governance in the 
European Union. Indeed, increasingly Europeanized national public spheres 
present promising avenues of politicization (cf. Statham and Trenz 2013). This 
is especially the case when also the television news media attempt to fulfil 
their ‘postulate of reflectance’, bringing substantive political debate on 
European affairs increasingly to Europe’s living rooms. 
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Appendix 
Coding categories 
Category Code Substantive meaning 
Year 2008 News items from 2008 
2011 News items from 2011 
Country germany German news items 
netherlands Dutch news items 
News dimension domestic News (predominantly) on domestic issues 
eu News (predominantly) on EU affairs 
other_european_country News (predominantly) on other European countries 
[EU MS, candidate states and Schengen members]  
international News on other non-European countries, or 
international organizations 
News type socio_political News on issues  on political and social matters 
economic News on economic and financial issues 
socio_cultural News on issues concerning culture, folklore etc. 
foreign policy News on domestic or EU foreign policy 
sports News on sport events 
conflict News on armed conflicts 
misc News on miscellaneous topics such as natural 
disasters and accidents 
trivial News on trivial matters meant for entertainment 
Prominence high <= .3*[mean value of news item per country and 
year] 
intermediate >=.3*[mean value] AND <=.7*[mean value] 
low >=.7*[mean value] 
Framing positive Broadcasters use positive / optimistic framing 
negative Broadcasters use negative / pessimistic framing 
neutral Broadcasters neutral framing 
Evaluation no_evaluation No evaluations voiced by (political) actors 
eurosceptic Only actors voiced that question the functionality or 
the legitimacy of the EU or its policies. 
critical_europeanist Only actors voiced that do not question EU’s 
legitimacy, but engage in debate on certain EU 
policies or institutional scope.  
europhile Only actors voiced that are positive towards EU’s 
institutional design and substantive policies 
varied Multiple, opposing evaluations of EU voiced 
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